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SUBJECT: S/CRS COORDINATOR HERBST'S MEETINGS IN CANADA

11. (SBU) Summary: In meetings with Canadian officials to discuss areas for collaboration in improving post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, Ambassador John Herbst of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) heard that there is an emerging consensus in Canadian defense circles that the military role in post-conflict scenarios is primarily to support the development of local governance and that the military will often be in a supporting role to civilian agencies in this function. Canadian officials stressed the need for better established doctrine and a desire to stay closely connected to the U.S. and other international players in the development of new joint capabilities. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) briefed Ambassador Herbst on its current operations, which includes 166 police trainers and advisors in Afghanistan, Haiti, and Sudan drawn from a mix of the federal RCMP as well as local and provincial police. Canadian officials also compared notes on a number of bureaucratic stumbling blocks to an effective post-conflict response, including funding, organization, triggers, and political will. End Summary.

12. (SBU) S/CRS Coordinator Ambassador John Herbst met with Canadian counterparts December 21 to discuss areas for further collaboration as the U.S. and Canada improve their abilities to respond to post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction missions.

DND SEEKS COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO POST CONFLICT

13. (SBU) Anne Bradfield, Director General for Force Development Analysis in the Department of National Defence (DND), said there is an emerging consensus at DND that in post-conflict stabilization the military should not play a lead role, but rather a supporting role to civilian agencies. She described three waves in the evolution of thinking about post-conflict operations. First was CIMIC -- civil-military cooperation teams that support military operations by garnering local support through civil affairs and humanitarian projects. Next was the 3D approach, which sought to integrate diplomatic, development, and defense tools in support of a foreign policy objective. The emerging concept is for a "comprehensive approach," which puts all available tools in support of the center of gravity, which is generally governance. Bradfield said this evolution in thinking was on display during recent briefings for the commander of the next rotation in the Afghan mission. There was more emphasis on governance and an emerging understanding that security operations will be conducted in support of governance, and the new commander wanted to ensure he had a clear understanding of how this shift was playing out in terms of resources and

responsibilities. Bradfield said this would change the way the PRTs are organized and will change military operations to emphasize longevity and staying power, rather than short-term offensive operations.

14. (SBU) Bradfield expressed frustration with MNE-5 which she said had led to a number of positive tactical gains but is lacking an overarching objective and end-state. She cited dismissive attitudes by the chair toward the role of NGOs and questioned the logic of bringing in various countries in the process who do not have established post-conflict capabilities. She also noted some SHAPE officials dismissed a Canadian presentation dealing with the "comprehensive Qa Canadian presentation dealing with the "comprehensive approach" because it was not yet approved by SHAPE headquarters. Bradfield wondered if, rather than putting our heads down and pushing forward, we would not benefit more from taking some time out to figure out what we have achieved and where we need to collectively go in the MNE process.

15. (SBU) Bradfield also expressed a need to develop doctrine that would then be institutionalized and lead to greater clarity in training and operations. She decried the current situation where Canadian agencies conduct lessons learned exercises and make changes to their SOPs in isolation, and seek to push things in a true "whole of government" direction with all agencies reading from the same script. Bradfield expressed a desire to continue to collaborate closely with us as we develop new doctrines and capabilities, and to achieve as much "jointness" in our systems as possible.

PCO SEEKS CLARITY IN ENGAGING THE CIVILIAN CAPABILITIES

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16. (SBU) The Privy Council's Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet for Foreign Affairs (rough equivalent to an NSC Director) Jill Sinclair voiced interest in U.S. efforts to plan and organize for post-conflict stabilization, in particular the triggers that we use to know when to engage. She asked about our planning and perceived role for S/CRS teams in current and future hot spots and about our ability to achieve inter-agency harmony in the process and how we align new capabilities with standing DOD organizations. Sinclair also said she was interested in staying in close touch as we work these issues in NATO and the G-8.

RCMP KEEPS UP A RESPECTABLE PACE OF DEPLOYMENTS

17. (SBU) The RCMP's Director General for International Policing Dave Beer said that the RCMP's goal is to have 200 police officers in a deployable status (either deployed or ready to deploy) at any given time. There are currently 166 deployed, including 100 in Haiti, 25 in Afghanistan, and 15 in Darfur. They are conducting a mix of training and conventional civ/pol duties, some armed and some unarmed, as part of international missions. Between two-thirds and three-fourths of the officers are from partner agencies, e.g. local police forces, and not the RCMP itself. The RCMP pays all costs for the deployment, including reimbursing the sending agency for salaries; personnel are guaranteed their jobs will be available when they return.

18. (SBU) Beer described the Afghanistan mission as having the highest profile of anything the RCMP is doing abroad, although it is much smaller than the Haiti mission. He said the main role is training the Afghan police but there is not yet adequate security to deploy a conventional civilian police mission, which will require NATO militaries to continue their lead role in police development in the field for the near future. He described the slow progress in the Afghan police force, who are being killed at a ratio of 22 to 1 compared to the Afghan National Army, while

getting paid only 70% of what a soldier earns, when they are paid at all.

TRIGGERS, THE UN ROLE, THE BENCH, AND SUCCESS

¶9. (SBU) Ambassador Herbst later attended a luncheon that included participation from the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), Public Safety Canada, the RCMP, DND, PCO, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). Canadian colleagues raised the issue of how to develop a system of triggers that can link what is happening in a foreign country on the brink to the political process and decision-making in our own countries. One participant suggested that the UN remains the best place to do reconstruction and stabilization and urged the U.S. to support efforts to make the UN more effective at such missions. He recounted historical data that indicates UN-led missions are more successful than those done unilaterally or in coalition.

¶10. (SBU) There was also a discussion of the development of a "bench" of secondary responders for post-conflict stabilization, and high-regard for the U.S. effort to systematize and fund a robust bench, in contrast to the Canadian system, which one participants described as "volunteers on paper." Finally, there was a discussion of what constitutes "success" in post-conflict stabilization, Qwhat constitutes "success" in post-conflict stabilization, and the need to be realistic about what can be achieved.

MIX OF DISASTER AND NON-DISASTER RESPONSE

¶11. (SBU) Assistant Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for International Security Colleen Swords described some of the bureaucratic complexities Canada faces as it develops a more robust post-conflict response mechanism. She said triggers remain undeveloped, but even with an approved trigger mechanism to highlight an emerging crisis it is not a given that the government will see it is in Canada's interest to respond. Swords said that because the START team has a role in natural as well as man-made disasters, it can often be pulled off in large numbers and expend considerable amounts of its budget in what are increasingly "routine" crisis. Funding for both man-made and natural

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disasters also come from multiple sources, Swords said, e.g., only CIDA can fund most Iraq projects, while the helicopters for Darfur come from the START team. There has also been a proliferation of task forces to show emphasis to a certain issue or area, according to Swords, including for Sudan, Afghanistan, and Haiti, but this then creates a new bureaucratic dynamic. Swords reiterated that Canada remains eager to increase international involvement and synchronization.

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